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      hat armed groups engage in hostilities on a frequent basis is not news. 
Indeed, armed groups are active in the majority of contemporary armed con-
flicts.1 What seems to have changed in the last few years is the increasing 
attention that the international community is paying to their behaviors, 
largely due to the impact that these behaviors have on civilians.2 While the 
international legal obligations of armed groups seem clear, at least within 
international humanitarian law (IHL),3 finding effective implementing strat-
egies to improve legal compliance remains a difficult endeavor, especially 
considering that the baseline expectation is generally low.4 
Armed groups are often responsible for attacks against health care pro-
viders, which is one of the greatest humanitarian problems of contemporary 
armed conflict.5 In a number of armed conflicts, medical workers have been 
                                                                                                                      
1. ANNYSSA BELLAL, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WAR REPORT 2018, at 19 (2019); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE RED CROSS, THE ROOTS OF RESTRAINT IN WAR 13–14 (2018). 
2. Some recent studies have focused on these entities. See generally TILMAN RODENHÄU-
SER, ORGANIZING REBELLION: NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
(2018); KATHARINE FORTIN, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED GROUPS UNDER HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW (2017); DARAGH MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE 
ARMED GROUPS (2016); HYERAN JO, COMPLIANT REBELS: REBEL GROUPS AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN WORLD POLITICS (2015); REBEL GOVERNANCE IN CIVIL WAR (Ana 
Arjona, Nelson Kasfir & Zachariah Mampilly eds., 2015). 
3. Non-state armed groups are bound by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions and customary IHL, as well as by Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 
when the conflict falls within its more restricted scope of application. The application of 
international human rights law to armed groups has also gained momentum. Although the 
wording of the main treaties of this legal regime addresses only the behavior of States, it has 
been proposed that there could be an added value in holding groups to account under hu-
man rights law, in particular due to their replacement of State control over a given territory 
and population. See FORTIN, supra note 2, at 27–68; MURRAY, supra note 2, at 120–54; see also 
Annyssa Bellal & Ezequiel Heffes, ‘Yes, I do’: Binding Armed Non-State Actors to IHL and Hu-
man Rights Norms Through Their Consent, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL LAW DIS-
COURSE 120 (2018). 
4. Hyeran Jo, Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: 
How Can It Be Improved?, 19 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 69 
(2018). 
5. In 2014, the International Committee of the Red Cross published a report that rec-
orded 1,809 violent incidents relating to the provision of healthcare in twenty-three coun-












kidnapped, injured, or killed, medical facilities and transports have been 
bombed, shelled, or looted, wounded fighters and patients have been at-
tacked, and fighting has occurred within or near health care facilities.6 Access 
to medical services is often obstructed and attacks have led to health care 
personnel leaving conflict areas, thereby further exacerbating the trend. 
These actions could affect the provision of medical care even after the 
fighting has stopped.7 
Armed groups, however, also have attempted to evacuate and treat 
wounded enemy fighters and civilians. In certain contexts, they have even 
proactively provided health care services for the civilian population living in 
the territories under their control. Examples include the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) in Eritrea, the Polisario Front in Western Sahara, 
the FARC-EP in Colombia, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
in Sri Lanka, and Hezbollah in Lebanon.8 The Taliban even established a 
Health Commission,9 and it has been reported that members of the Free 
                                                                                                                      
more than 700 of these violent incidents. Although many incidents consisted only of threats, 
armed groups have also killed healthcare personnel and patients, looted healthcare facilities, 
forced medical staff to provide free treatment, and forced them to treat their own members 
before others. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, HEALTH CARE IN 
DANGER: VIOLENT INCIDENTS AFFECTING THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE, JANUARY 
2012 TO DECEMBER 2013, at 10 (2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4196-
health-care-danger-violent-incidents-affecting-delivery-health-care-january-2012; see also 
Fiona Terry, Violence Against Health Care: Insights from Afghanistan, Somalia and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, 95 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 23 (2013); see generally 
Attacks on Health Care, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, https://www.who.int/emergen-
cies/attacks-on-health-care/en/ (last visited July 8, 2019). 
6. One example is the recent attacks by armed groups against Ebola Treatment Centers 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Ebola Virus Disease – Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.who.int/csr/don/ 
14-march-2019-ebola-drc/en/; see also Susannah Cullinane, Ebola Treatment Center Attacked 
Again as Congo Battles a Deadly Epidemic, CNN (Mar. 10, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com 
/2019/03/10/health/ebola-drc-congo-who-death/index.html. 
7. Aryn Baker, Syria’s Health Crisis Spirals as Doctors Flee, TIME (Feb. 4, 2014), http:// 
time.com/3968/syrias-health-crisis-spirals-as-doctors-flee/. 
8. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 258. 
9. Annex: The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Layha [Code of Conduct] For Mujahids, 93 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 81, 103, 117 (2011); see also Muhammad Mu-
nir, The Layha for the Mujahideen: An Analysis of the Code of Conduct for the Taliban Fighters under 












Syrian Army have set up a secret hospital to care for individuals.10 Further-
more, several armed groups have committed to respect and protect health 
care in armed conflict through different means, such as unilateral declara-
tions, codes of conduct, and agreements with humanitarian organizations.11 
This article describes some of the key challenges related to the variation 
of armed groups’ behaviors and the protection of health care. Part II defines 
armed groups for the purposes of this article, while Part III addresses armed 
groups and compliance with international law concerning health care pro-
tection, inquiring into why some armed groups attacked medical facilities, 
staff, and transports, while others have taken positive measures to ensure the 
protection of medical professionals and the provision of medical care. Part 
IV introduces the approach undertaken by Geneva Call when engaging these 
non-State actors and discusses its new Deed of Commitment on the Protection of 
Health Care in Armed Conflict. Part V concludes by assessing the protection of 
health care and the future of humanitarian engagement with armed groups. 
 
II. DEFINING ARMED GROUPS 
 
Although the nature, organization, and structure of armed groups are issues 
of increasing concern, relatively little is known about these groups from an 
international law perspective.12 There are two explanations. First, assuming 
the existence of a non-international armed conflict, the law applicable to 
armed groups is part of public international law, which was and remains 
                                                                                                                      
10. CNN, Syria Rebels Set up a Secret Hospital to Care for Refugees, YOUTUBE (Sept. 6, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WhDtLokvi4I. 
11. For instance, the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) has included 
within its list of core principles to “[r]espect and protect medical personnel and objects, 
including those bearing the Red Cross/Red Crescent/Red Crystal, and other symbols of 
humanitarian organizations.” See PULO, List of Core Principles of PULO’s Engagement 
Rules r. 6 (2012), http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/th_pulo_01-ea2ba13b6dc3c 
5a3b5d202f280ee6e1b.pdf. 
Similarly, the 1992 agreement on the application of IHL between the parties to the 
conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina contained a commitment to respect and protect the 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked. It also stated, “Hospitals and other medical units, includ-
ing medical transportation may in no circumstances be attacked, they shall at all times be 
respected and protected. They may not be used to shield combatants, military objectives or 
operations from attacks.” Bosnia and Herzegovina, Agreement No. 1 of May 22, 1992 art. 
2.2(1), Bosn & Herz., May 22, 1992, reprinted in 3 MARCO SASSÒLI, ANTOINE A. BOUVIER 
& ANNE QUINTIN, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 1717, 1719 (3d ed. 2011). 













State-centric.13 Second, from a methodological perspective, “armed group” 
encompasses a variety of entities with different features, goals, and even in-
ternational obligations.14 While some groups may have strong individual 
leaders, such as Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 
Uganda, Foday Sankoh of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra 
Leone, or John Garang of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) in Sudan, others may be more dispersed and decentralized.15 Fur-
thermore, armed groups may fight against foreign military occupation, to 
remove or replace existing governments, to become an independent State, 
to promote a religious agenda, or act from purely economic incentives.16 As 
such, identifying and categorizing common constitutive elements from these 
groups has proven a rather difficult task, particularly for international lawyers. 
The lack of unified criteria has led to the use of many different terms to 
refer to the same type of entity: “armed groups,” “non-State armed groups,” 
“armed non-State actors,” “armed opposition groups,” “rebels,” and so on. 
While at times the term used depends on the international rules under anal-
ysis, as may be the case of specific treaties referring to a given term,17 others 
                                                                                                                      
13. Id. 
14. Even IHL, which undisputedly applies to non-State armed groups, foresees that 
highly organized entities will be bound by more international obligations than other groups. 
In order to be applicable, the 1977 Additional Protocol II requires that organized armed 
groups that are under responsible command “exercise such control over a part of [the] ter-
ritory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement [the] Protocol.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 
1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. See also Olivier Bangerter, The ICRC and Non-State 
Armed Groups, in EXPLORING CRITERIA AND CONDITIONS FOR ENGAGING ARMED NON-
STATE ACTORS TO RESPECT HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 74, 76 (2008). 
15. JO, supra note 2, at 39. 
16. GENEVA ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, POLICY BRIEFING NO. 1, REACTIONS TO NORMS: ARMED GROUPS AND THE PRO-




17. See, for example, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict art. 4(1), May 25, 2000, 54 U.N.T.S. 263, 
and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1(1), supra note 14 (noting 
the Optional Protocol discusses “[a]rmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of 
a State,” while Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II discusses “dissident armed forces or 












are related to the specific features of armed groups that want to be stressed. 
In this article, four elements are used to identify an armed group: (i) the 
armed group should be illegal under domestic law, or should at least chal-
lenge the State’s monopoly of the use of force; (ii) the group is not part of, 
or controlled by, a State; (iii) the group is created mainly to use armed vio-
lence; and (iv) unlike governments, the armed group as such will most likely 
cease to exist after the end of an armed conflict, either because it triumphs 
in its struggle, eliminating the need to fight, or is defeated and disbanded.18 
The last two elements stress the intrinsic relation between the notions of 
armed conflict and the notion of armed group, since the latter cannot exist 
without the former.19 
 
III. ARMED GROUPS, COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND 
HEALTH CARE 
 
Compliance has been defined as “behavioural conformity with existing 
norms and regulations.”20 For armed groups, this implies the observed match 
between their behavior and their international obligations.21 
As any party to an armed conflict, armed groups should not be seen as 
entities that either violate or respect international law without exception. In-
stead, they may follow certain rules while disregarding others.22 For instance, 
an armed group may respect the prohibition on using and recruiting children 
in hostilities, but at the same time summarily execute detainees or take hos-
tages. Similarly, an armed group may deliberately attack health care facilities 
                                                                                                                      
18. Armed groups are indeed provisional in character. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 130 (2005). In order to identify an armed group as a party to an armed 
conflict a list of non-exhaustive factors utilized by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia is often referred to: (i) the existence of a command structure; (ii) the 
military (operational) capacity of the armed group; (iii) its logistical capacity; (iv) the exist-
ence of an internal disciplinary system and the ability to implement IHL; and (v) its ability 
to speak with one voice. See Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, 
Judgment, ¶¶ 197–203 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008). 
19. See Marco Sassòli, Two Fascinating Questions: Are All Subjects of a Legal Order Bound by 
the Same Customary Law and Can Armed Groups Exist in the Absence of Armed Conflict?, EJIL 
TALK! (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/book-discussion-daragh-murrays-human-
rights-obligations-of-non-state-armed-groups-3/ (noting that Sassòli argues against the ex-
istence of armed groups in the absence of armed conflicts). 
20. JO, supra note 4, at 65. 
21. Id. 
22. MICHAEL L. GROSS, THE ETHICS OF INSURGENCY: A CRITICAL GUIDE TO JUST 












and transports in breach of IHL while prohibiting the forcible displacement 
of civilians. Moreover, these non-State entities often modify their behaviors 
throughout the hostilities, reflecting an increase or decrease in their level of 
compliance with humanitarian provisions. For example, Wood has identified 
that civilian victimization is “anticipated during moments in which the via-
bility of the groups is threatened or when it faces significant military set-
backs.”23 For Weinstein, this variation is a result of the membership and or-
ganizational structure of the group. He argues, “[s]tructures matter because 
they affect the capacity of rebel leaders to employ violence selectively with-
out making errors; mistakes make a difference because they affect the calcu-
lations of potential civilian supports about how to respond to rebel groups 
when they enter a region.”24 Variation is also evident in peace processes. 
When an armed group looks for political recognition, they might adopt a 
different attitude than a group whose main purpose is to show its strength 
or to terrorize the civilian population living in the territory it controls.25 
Accordingly, compliance should be understood as a spectrum, rather 
than an on/off switch.26 As such, armed groups’ behavior is better concep-
tualized as “a matter of degree varying with the circumstances of the case.”27 
This conclusion acknowledges that while some groups have deliberately at-
tacked medical personnel, facilities, and transports, others have attempted to 
                                                                                                                      
23. Reed M. Wood, Understanding Strategic Motives for Violence against Civilians during Civil 
Conflict, in INDUCING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: LESSONS 
FROM THE AFRICAN GREAT LAKES REGION 13, 15 (Heike Krieger ed., 2015) [hereinafter 
INDUCING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW]. 
24. JEREMY M. WEINSTEIN, INSIDE REBELLION: THE POLITICS OF INSURGENT VIO-
LENCE 198 (2007). 
25. Jo has argued that compliant ANSAs emerge when they seek legitimacy. “Compli-
ant rebels are those that want to enhance the ‘legitimacy’ of their own organization and 
movement in the eyes of key political ‘audiences’ that care about values consistent with 
international law at domestic and international ‘levels.’” JO, supra note 2, at 13. It should be 
noted that this is not true in every context. For instance, in Sri Lanka, human rights re-
searchers documented that the LTTE used civilians as human shields, shot civilians as they 
tried to flee the group’s control, deployed artillery near civilians, and forcibly recruited chil-
dren as soldiers during the final months of the conflict. See Meenakshi Ganguly, Sri Lanka 
Takes the Wrong Road to Peace, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 17, 2011), https://www.hrw. 
org/news/2011/05/17/sri-lanka-takes-wrong-road-peace. 
26. Richard A. Falk, On Identifying and Solving the Problem of Compliance with International 
Law, 58 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS 
ANNUAL MEETING 1, 5 (1964); see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, 
THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREE-
MENTS 17 (1995). 












evacuate and treat wounded enemy fighters and civilians. Armed groups 
should therefore be seen as dynamic and evolving actors. Like States, these 
non-State entities may weigh the costs against the benefits of complying with 
international law, and the results will vary depending on the goals of the 
group and the moment in which its behavior takes place.28 
The figure below shows how an armed group complied with two differ-
ent rules, the prohibition on the use and recruitment of children and the 
prohibition on deliberatively targeting civilians, throughout an armed con-
flict.29 The figure demonstrates that armed groups may increase or decrease 
their compliance at different moments of the conflict. Understanding that 
these non-State entities do not have the same approach to every rule 
throughout the conflict is essential. Indeed, such nuance is crucial for hu-
manitarian organizations, such as Geneva Call, when defining its strategies 
of IHL engagement with these groups.30 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
28. TANISHA FAZAL, WARS OF LAW: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN THE REGULA-
TION OF ARMED CONFLICT 59 (2018). 
29. The data included in the figure does not represent any specific armed group. Its 
inclusion is only to clarify the proposed explanation. 
30. The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights has 
identified, in this sense, that “[t]hose seeking to promote compliance with international 
norms should monitor the conflict for ‘windows of opportunity’ that may offer a greater 
chance for success of engagement on specific humanitarian concerns.” ANYSSA BELLAL & 
STUART CASEY-MASLEN, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: PROTECTING CIVILIANS THROUGH 
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While important, identifying this behavioral variation remains a some-
what superficial analysis. For example, in non-international armed conflicts, 
compliance by armed groups can be linked to several factors, such as the 
group’s lack of knowledge of international standards and the absence of an 
incentive to abide by the applicable rules.31 In this sense, as Bangerter cor-
rectly notes, “only a relatively small circle of persons are aware of legal con-
cepts in any given society, and it is unlikely that leaders of armed groups will 
be recruited in this particular circle.”32 Armed groups may not know, for 
instance, what medical ethics and triage imply or how to deal with humani-
tarian access, key principles for the delivery of health care by humanitarian 
organizations.33 Their lack of incentive to respect humanitarian norms might 
result from a complex mixture of diverse motivations. As Krieger concludes, 
power relations, as well as historical, political, and social conditions, serve to 
determine these motivations, making compliance a context-dependent is-
sue.34 Furthermore, some humanitarian norms can be perceived as prohibit-
ing actions that “often serve the strategic interests of rebel groups – the sort 
of actions that may, at times, give them a competitive advantage over gov-
ernment forces.”35 
Armed groups’ fragmented structures and lack of capacity to implement 
their obligations can also present important challenges for compliance.36 The 
                                                                                                                      
31. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: ICRC EXPERT SEMINARS 20–21 (2003), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/improving_compliance_with_international_ 
report_eng_2003.pdf; see also Olivier Bangerter, Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect 
International Humanitarian Law or Not, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 353, 
357 (2011). 
32. Olivier Bangerter, Comment: Persuading Armed Groups to Better Respect International Hu-
manitarian Law, in INDUCING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
supra note 23, at 112, 113. 
33. As Geneva Call found, several groups felt that they did not have a complete under-
standing of the rules governing humanitarian access and consequently “are not able to elab-
orate on what they entail.” ASHLEY JACKSON, GENEVA CALL, IN THEIR WORDS: PERCEP-
TIONS OF ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS ON HUMANITARIAN ACTION 14 (2016), 
https://www.genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2016/09/WHS_Report_ 
2016_web.pdf. 
34. Heike Krieger, Introduction to INDUCING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW, supra note 23, at 1, 4–5. 
35. JO, supra note 2, at 6. 
36. Several researchers have demonstrated that the way armed groups are organized 












ICRC has recognized this challenge in its recent Commentary on Common 
Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.37 Regarding the obligation to care 
for the wounded and sick, the ICRC has explained that some groups have 
the capacity to provide sophisticated medical care, while others have more 
rudimentary capacities.38 Nonetheless, non-State armed groups must en-
deavor to provide treatment to the best of their abilities. The obligation to 
care for the wounded and sick is an obligation of means, even if the exact 
requirement depends on the specific circumstances of each case.39 
Exchanges between Geneva Call and various armed groups have con-
firmed that a lack of capacity is a key factor in whether international law is 
respected. Many groups, particularly those with a lower level of organization, 
a weak coercive capacity for enforcing organizational decisions, or a decen-
tralized authority, have less potential to guarantee their members will respect 
most of these rules. Further, the very structure and rationale of armed groups 
challenge the likelihood of meeting some of these obligations, as they are 
created to perform combat functions, not to provide health care, and they 
devote a large amount of their resources to their military components. 
Certain organizations and initiatives have attempted to address some of 
these difficulties by recognizing that it is essential to engage with these 
groups in order to enhance the protection of health care in armed conflicts. 
One important example is UN Security Council Resolution 2286, the first 
resolution to focus specifically on attacks on health services in armed con-
flict.40 Moreover, the UN Secretary-General published a list of recommen-
dations pursuant to this Resolution,41 including measures to enhance the pro-
tection of and prevent acts of violence against the wounded and sick, medical 
                                                                                                                      
tin Blakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham & Lee J. M. Seymour, The Problem with Frag-
mented Insurgencies, WASHINGTON POST (May 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/13/the-problem-with-fragmented-insurgencies/. 
37. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST 
GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION 
OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶ 753 (2016) (noting 
with respect to the obligation to collect the wounded and sick that “if significant resources 
in terms of personnel and equipment are available, their deployment is required according 
to what is reasonable. Conversely, if resources are scarce, the Convention does not require 
Parties to do the impossible, but they must do what is feasible under the given circum-
stances, taking into account all relevant resources”). 
38. Id. ¶ 761. 
39. Id. ¶¶ 761–62. 
40. S.C. Res. 2286 (May 3, 2016). 












and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, and their 
means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical 
facilities.42 It also included measures aimed to ensure greater accountability 
for violations of these protections.43 
Two recommendations are especially relevant when dealing with armed 
groups. First, recommendation seven, “Promoting awareness and compli-
ance,” affirms that member States and parties to a conflict, with the support 
from the UN and relevant organizations, “should undertake training pro-
grammes for military personnel and members of non-State armed groups on the 
protection of medical care in armed conflict.”44 Second, recommendation 
nine encourages parties to make and enforce internal measures, such as com-
mand orders, dissemination activities, and sanctions, aimed at enhancing the 
protection of medical care in armed conflict.45 
Different institutions and organizations have taken various measures fol-
lowing these recommendations. For example, Geneva Call started working 
to increase the respect of rules related to the protection of health care in 
armed conflict.46 Part IV presents Geneva Call’s approach when engaging 
with non-State actors, and discusses its new Deed of Commitment on the pro-
tection of health care. 
 
IV. GENEVA CALL’S NEW DEED OF COMMITMENT: A PROMISING DEVEL-
OPMENT FOR THE PROTECTION OF HEALTH CARE 
 
The need to engage armed groups to enhance their respect for humanitarian 
norms is not a new concern. The most important organization in this regard 
is the ICRC, which engages with non-State entities as parties to armed con-
flict to fulfill its mandate. Indeed, as far back as 1871, the ICRC’s founder, 
                                                                                                                      
Further requests the Secretary General to promptly provide the Security Council 
with recommendations on measures to prevent incidents of the kind described 
[in the Resolution] and to better ensure accountability and enhance the protection 
of the wounded and sick and medical personnel and humanitarian personnel ex-
clusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as 
well as hospitals and other medical facilities. 
42. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Aug. 18, 2016 from the Secretary-General ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, 1, U.N. Doc. S/2016/722 (Aug. 18, 2016). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
45. Id. at 6–8. 














Henry Dunant, engaged with leaders of the Paris Commune to negotiate the 
release of hostages taken by rebel groups.47 Over the last three decades, other 
institutions and non-governmental organizations have joined the ICRC in 
engaging armed groups.48 In 2000, members of the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines created Geneva Call, which acknowledges that armed 
groups are key entities for improving the implementation of IHL in armed 
conflict.49 As of 2019, Geneva Call has engaged with approximately 100 
armed groups on different humanitarian issues.50 
 
A. Geneva Call’s Approach 
 
When engaging armed groups on humanitarian norms, the State-centric na-
ture of international law presents specific challenges. Three challenges are 
especially prevalent: (i) existing international treaties regulate almost exclu-
sively the conduct of States; (ii) even though armed groups are bound by 
IHL, they cannot negotiate treaties or become parties to relevant agreements, 
and they cannot contribute to the formation of customary international law;51 
and (iii) armed groups’ views on humanitarian norms are generally dismissed, 
thus they may have limited incentives to respect them. In sum, armed groups 
may not feel bound by rules that they have not been involved in making and 
are not allowed to sign.52 
                                                                                                                      
47. Bangerter, supra note 14, at 75. 
48. The United Nations, through its framework to address the situation of children 
affected by armed conflict, is an important example in this regard. This framework allows 
armed groups to engage with UN agencies and sign “action plans,” which could lead to 
delisting groups from the UN Secretary-General’s list of actors that commit one or more of 
the six grave violations of children’s rights, including attacks against schools and hospitals. 
For more information, see OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL FOR CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT, UNITED NATIONS, https://childrenan-
darmedconflict.un.org/ (last visited July 8, 2019). 
49. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 12, at 538. 
50. GENEVA CALL, MISSION, https://genevacall.org/who-we-are/ (last visited July 8, 
2019). 
51. As affirmed in a previous study, this has an impact on armed groups’ respect for 
IHL from a practical perspective, since it seems unlikely that they will accept any set of rules 
“merely by the fact that it has been previously agreed upon by States, be it customary or 
treaty law.” Ezequiel Heffes & Marcos Kotlik, Special Agreements as a Means of Enhancing Com-
pliance with IHL in Non-International Armed Conflicts: An Inquiry into the Governing Legal Regime, 
96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1195, 1202 (2014). 
52. Elisabeth Decrey Warner et al., Armed Non-State Actors and Humanitarian Norms: Les-
sons from the Geneva Call Experience, in MODERN WARFARE: ARMED GROUPS, PRIVATE MILI-












Addressing these challenges has been an essential part of Geneva Call 
and the organization’s work. Because the 1997 Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on their Destruction53 (the Ottawa Convention) did not formally 
bind armed groups, Geneva Call developed an innovative tool, the Deed of 
Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation 
in Mine Action,54 that would allow these armed non-State entities to commit 
to this treaty’s core obligations. This Deed of Commitment attempted to solve 
the treaty’s limited scope of application by offering “a parallel process for 
non-State armed actors . . . to actively enter a formal commitment to ban 
anti-personnel landmines.”55 By acknowledging the importance of armed 
groups’ consent to their international obligations, the Deed aims to develop 
their sense of ownership of the humanitarian rules they undertake to respect 
and their understanding that they will be held accountable for their pledge. 
Such an inclusive approach is instrumental in increasing how these groups 
show respect for international norms. 
While initially focusing on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, Ge-
neva Call has since expanded its thematic work to other humanitarian issues, 
including the protection of children, the prohibition of sexual violence and 
gender discrimination, the protection of cultural heritage, the prohibition of 
forcibly displaced individuals, and the protection of health care.56 However, 
not all of these issues have a thematic Deed of Commitment. Finally, in addition 
to its thematic engagement process, Geneva Call provides training to armed 
groups on humanitarian norms, as group members are often unaware of their 
obligations and providing information and training on these rules is essential 
to increasing their level of respect for these norms. 
 
                                                                                                                      
2012); see also JO, supra note 2, at 256 (concluding that “[f]rom a rebel perspective, an oppor-
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53. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211. 
54. Geneva Call, Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total 
Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action (2000), https://gene-
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B. The Deed of Commitment Mechanism and the Protection of Health Care 
 
In addition to the Deed of Commitment banning anti-personnel mines, Geneva 
Call has developed three additional deeds: the Deed of Commitment for the Pro-
tection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict (2010),57 the Deed of Commit-
ment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict and Towards 
the Elimination of Gender Discrimination (2012),58 and the Deed of Commitment for 
the Protection of Health Care in Armed Conflict (2018).59 These four Deeds of Com-
mitment mirror international rules applicable to States and include both neg-
ative and positive obligations. Crucially, they allow armed groups to pledge 
to respect these humanitarian norms. 
Importantly, armed groups may sign these deeds only after meeting cer-
tain conditions. First, they should have an impact on the thematic area cov-
ered by the Deed in question. For example, if a group does not use anti-per-
sonnel mines, and this is not a humanitarian concern in their specific context, 
encouraging the signing of the Deed dealing with these weapons will not have 
a direct impact. Second, the armed group should have a clear leadership 
structure that represents their members and can sign the document on behalf 
of the entire group. It should also be capable of internalizing the obligations 
it has undertaken through training and internal orders. Finally, Geneva Call 
and its partner organizations are granted the right to monitor the group’s 
compliance with the Deeds in the territories where the signing group operates. 
Geneva Call cannot offer Deeds of Commitment to an armed group unless 
the group fulfills these requirements.60 If the armed group meets these crite-
ria, its leadership signs the Deed, which Geneva Call and the Government 
of the Republic and Canton of Geneva, which serves as a custodian of the 
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58. Geneva Call, Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for the Prohibition of Sex-
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document, then countersigns.61 As of June 2019, sixty-four armed groups 
have signed one or more Deeds of Commitments.62 
When dealing with the protection of health care, Geneva Call has carried 
out activities related to dissemination and training of humanitarian norms, 
including protection of the wounded and sick, health care staff, facilities and 
transport, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems.63 Furthermore, 
and as noted earlier, Geneva Call developed a specific Deed of Commitment on 
the protection of health care in 2018.64 For this purpose, it conducted two 
consultations with experts from key organizations and academic institutions 
in Geneva and shared the draft with selected armed groups to include their 
views and inputs as a sort of “reality check.”65 These non-State actors were 
chosen carefully to ensure that various types of groups were included, and 
that there was a balanced geographical representation. 
The new Deed includes obligations for the groups to respect and protect 
“the wounded and sick, whether civilian or military, friend or enemy, in all 
circumstances;” to take all “possible measures to search for, collect and evac-
uate the wounded and sick without delay or adverse distinction, including by 
allowing civilians and impartial humanitarian organizations to assist in these 
tasks;” and to respect and protect “health care personnel engaged in the pro-
vision of health care” and health care facilities.66 The signatory group also 
undertakes to protect and respect medical transport, to respect the distinc-
tive emblems of the Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red Crystal, and not to 
use them for purposes unrelated to the provision of health care.67 Finally, 
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in 1864. Id. 
62. This information is on file with the author. 
63. Geneva Call has also addressed the issue of health care through other Deeds. For 
example, the deed protecting children commits armed groups to “take concrete measures 
towards ensuring that children have access to adequate . . . health care (including psycho-
social support) . . . .” Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for the Protection of Chil-
dren from the Effects of Armed Conflict, supra note 57, art. 7(i). 
64. Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Health Care in Armed Conflict, supra 
note 59. 
65. These organizations included the ICRC, the World Health Organization, Doctors 
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armed groups commit to “[e]nsure, maintain and provide access for affected 
populations to essential health care facilities, goods and services, without ad-
verse distinction” in areas where they exercise authority.68 Although the most 
recent Deed on the protection of health care has not yet been signed by an 
armed group, Geneva Call’s prior success in dealing with other thematic ar-
eas, such as the prohibition of anti-personnel mines and the protection of 
children, gives hope that the protection and respect for health care by armed 
groups will be embraced. 
Common provisions to all Deeds affirm that armed groups agree to take 
necessary measures to enforce their commitments (through internal orders, 
training, and sanctions) as well as to cooperate with Geneva Call to verify 
their compliance.69 Although there are no formal deadlines or benchmarks 
included in the Deeds by which these activities should take place, this is gen-
erally discussed and addressed through implementation plans between Ge-
neva Call and the relevant group. Finally, armed groups acknowledge that 
adhering to any of the Deeds shall not affect their legal status, as stated in 
Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.70 They also accept that, 
in cases of confirmed violations, Geneva Call may publicize them as a means 
of sanctioning their non-compliance.71 
 
V. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF ENGAGEMENT 
 
Interestingly, the compliance record of armed groups engaged by Geneva 
Call generally has been good.72 For instance, signatories of the Deeds have 
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abided by their commitment on the prohibition of using anti-personnel 
mines, cooperation in mine action, and destroying their stockpiles.73 They 
have also demobilized children from their ranks.74 Other groups have 
pledged to prohibit or limit the use of this weapon, unilaterally or through 
agreements with governments.75 
The signing of Geneva Call’s Deeds has also been relevant when the State 
fighting against the non-State group has not ratified the international con-
vention dealing with that specific humanitarian topic. Decisions by armed 
groups to sign one or more of these Deeds were, in this sense, instrumental 
to the accession of States to international treaties due to internal social pres-
sure within the State in question.76 For example, Sudan ratified the Ottawa 
Convention in 2003, only after the Sudan People’s Liberation Move-
ment/Army (SPLM/A) signed the corresponding Deed of Commitment in 
2001. High-level officials involved in mine action activities in that country 
indicated that the government would not have ratified this international 
treaty if not for the SPLM/A’s signing of the Deed.77 Interestingly, when 
South Sudan became a new State in 2011 and the SPLM/A became its gov-
ernment, the first humanitarian treaty to which it acceded was the Ottawa 
Convention.78 
As we look forward, reaching agreements with armed groups on these 
thematic areas provides an important step in furthering respect for, and com-
pliance with, IHL. Some may insist that publicly dealing with armed groups 
could legitimize their goals and aims, but as Cismas has correctly suggested, 
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“legitimation may indeed take place; however, one needs to understand and 
emphasize that the resulting legitimation is that of the actor as rights-holder 
and duty bearer, not of its goals and conduct.”79 The goal of inducing armed 
groups to respect international law is not to give them an international legal 
status. Instead, acknowledging that they should be aware that there are in-
ternational rules applicable to them, including those relating to health care, 
and giving them the opportunity to internalize these rules, can only help to 
eventually hold them accountable for their lack of respect. These measures 
are necessary to increase the protection of individuals in armed conflict. 
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